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Abstract 
Legislatures typically make q�cisions in stages : for example, 
first by subsets of members (in committees ) and then by the full 
I 
membership (on the floor ) , But different theories of two-stage 
decision-making employ different assumptions about the degree of 
foresight committee members exercise during the first stage , This 
paper reviews the relevant theories and reports on several experiments 
that test whether committees acting in a larger legislature make 
decisions consistent with the hypotheses of sophisticated or myopic 
behavior . Under diverse conditions -- including open and closed 
rules , and homogeneous and heteroge�eous preferences -- the
predictions of sophisticated behavior are superior not only to those 
of myopic behavior , but also to several other competing hypotheses , 
Implications of the findings for future theoretical developments are 
discussed , as are reservations regarding generalizing about real -world 
l egislatures on the basis of laboratory observations . 
SOPHISTICATION , MYOPIA , AND THE THEORY OF LEGISLATURES : 
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The proposition that commi ttees are crucial in the l egislative 
process has been described so frequently yet disputed so rarely that 
it is now almost tri te ; citations to Woodrow Wilson through Richard 
Fenno are no longer needed to defend the study of committees . 
However , consensus over the importance of committees does not 
automatically translate into agreement about how committees ought to 
be studied , While the development of theories about committees1 has 
coincided with the proliferation of studies of actual commi ttees ,2 the 
resulting accumulated wisdom nevertheless remains bifurcated in some 
fundamental ways , albeit for understandable reasons . On one hand , 
theories about committees are not readily testable in the field . 
Would we know , for example,  whether HR 6040 , a bill for expansion of 
the superfund for clean-up of toxic wastes , is in the bargaining set 
(Aumann and Maschler,  1 964) or is a competitive solution (McKelvey, 
Ordeshook and Wine r ,  1 97 8 ) ?  Would we even know whether it is a median 
motion (Black, 1 948) ? On the other hand, empirical research typically 
is concerned with different questions , such as what part commi ttees 
play in the larger, much more complex poli tical process . 
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Although the crossing of theoretical and empirical paths may be 
rare, researchers of one persuasion or the other are nei ther ignorant 
of the other's work nor oblivious to the limited applicability of 
their own . For exampl e ,  the possibility that "naturally occurring 
poli tical committees do not exist in splendid isolation" was 
acknowledged by Fiorina and Plott (1978,  p .  5 93 ) ,  who tested several 
hypotheses about committee decision-making . Al though their 
experiments were designed only "to explain what goes on within the 
'black box ' of committee decision-making" (p . 576) , they later asked : 
[I] f the committee decision is regarded by the members as only 
one stage in a sequence of games , might behavior in the committee 
reflect strategic considerations from the larger game? If so, a 
game might produce implications for the commi ttee st age which 
differ substantially from those implied by models successful in 
explaining the processes of isolated committees (p . 5 93 ) . 
The Fiorina-Plott possibility appropriately stresses the 
connection between theories of committee decision-making and actual 
committee decisions in more complex institutional settings . Moreover, 
it does so with an implicit but none theless crucial focus on 
prediction of committee decisions -- something that is often 
perfunctorily dismissed in field research as an unattainable goal . 
This paper seeks to assess our abili ty to predict committee 
decisions -- specifically , decisions of commi ttees that are embedded 
in an ongoing institution, such as a legislature . The major focus is 
on two theories that embody the Fiorina-Plott possibility . The 
central question i s :  Can committees that act in mul ti-stage settings 
behave with foresight ,  and, if so , to what extent is their exercise of 
foresight predictable in various institutional se ttings? Part I is a 
discussion of the essential similarities and differences of two 
theories of legislatures . Part II is a description of the design of 
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experiments conducted to test several hypotheses . Parts III , IV and V 
assess the possibil ity and predictability of sophisticated strategies 
in committees,  and the predictability of outcomes on the floor . And 
Part VI is a discussion of some doubts about and implications of the 
findings . 
I .  TWO THEORIES OF LEGISLATURES 
Formal theories of legislatures are relatively new, although 
their foundations can be found in the early works of Black (194 8 ,  
1 95 8 ) . The pioneering extension o f  Black's theory o f  committees to 
institutionally richer settings is that of Shepsle (1979) , whose 
formalizations of the distinguishing characteristics of legislatures 
can be paraphrased ( informally) as follows : 
1 .  Decisions are made in two (or mor e )  distinct stages by 
different subsets of actors at each stage . 
2 . A committee system assigns every decision-maker to at least one 
subset of decision-makers, called a committee . 
3 .  A jurisdictional system assigns every dimension of the policy 
space to one or more committees and grants committees the 
exclusive right to make initial proposals to change the status 
quo in those dimensions over which they have j urisdiction. 
4 .  Amendment control rules specify the conditions under which 
committees' proposals will be considered by the parent body 
( full set of members) . 
The remaining assumptions of committee-based theories of legislatures 
are more tradi tional , namely : 
s. Decision-makers have diverse but consistent preferences 
(variously characterized as transitiv e ,  single-peaked , or
positively monotonic in distance ) .
6 .  Voting is the means by which individual preferences are 
amalgamated into collective decisions . 
Consideration of a fundamental equation of politics helps to 
delineate present concerns . Suppose that poli tical outcomes result 
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from three types of ingredients : � preferences of decision-makers for 
various policies ; institutional features that specify the rules of the 
game, such as when , how and by whom decisions are made ; and strategies 
that decision-makers employ in their attempts to obtain preferred 
outcomes . Simply expressed : 
Outcomes = f (Preferences,  Institutions , Strategies ) . 3 
Whereas two similar extensions of Shepsle's theory (Denzau and Mackay, 
1 983 ; Krehbiel , 1 983 ) differ fundamentally from their predecessor only 
in terms of strategies , the main focus here is on the third component 
of the equation. The strategic assumption in Shepsle's theory is that 
committee members vote sincerely (a la Black ) ,  in which case a 
committee always chooses a bill that can be represented as the ideal 
point of the committee's median voter . In contrast,  foresight at the 
committee stage is incorporated into extended theories , in which the 
existence and location of committees' bills depend not only on 
preferences of committee members bu t also on preferences of 
noncommittee members , on the status quo point , and on the rules 
governing the offering of amendments on the floor . 
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For two such rules -- open and closed -- figure 1 illustrates the 
differences in bills and outcomes attributable exclusively to 
different strategic assumptions . Ideal points of committee members 
are shown as x's , noncommittee members' ideal points are o's , and 
vertical bars denote status quo points . All members are assumed to 
have single-peaked ,  symmetric preferences , and j urisdictions are 
unidimensional and nonoverlapping . 
[figure 1] 
Under the assumption of sincere behavior the committee always 
reports a bill (B) equal to its median voter's ideal point (CM ) . 
Under the open rule ( figure la) the reporting of such a bill is always 
followed by an amendment process that results in convergence of the 
amended version ( s )  of the bill to the floor median (FM ) , which 
ultimately becomes the outcome (0). Under the closed rule (figure lb ) 
the bill is agai n CM. Members , however , are barred from proposing 
amendments ,  so the second stage of decision-making consists of a 
single , binary choice on the floor between the bill (B) and the status 
quo point (S) . Since the floor median voter's ideal point is closer 
to S than to CM , he , and all members to his right , vote against the 
bil l ,  so the outcome is S .  
Yet both situations are ripe for sophisticated behavior in the 
sense that a majority on the committee can benefit from non-sincere 
action . 4 In all ripe open rule settings , at least a majority of 
members prefers the status quo ( S )  to the projected outcome (FM) under 
the amendment process . Whereas the committee and j urisdictional 
Figure 1 
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systems confer the exclusive right to make proposals to the committee , 
obstruction -- i . e . , refusal to report a bil l  -- is a preferred 
strategy for the committee . Similarly , the committee members in ripe 
closed rule se ttings prefer a victorious strategically placed bill 
(B'=O') ,  which barely obtains the vote of the floor median vote r ,  to 
the committee median bill (B=CM ) , which ultimately loses to s. 
The comparison of bills and outcomes under each assumption 
supports the characterization of committee strategies as myopic or 
sophisticated , depending on the refusal or willingness of the 
committee to exploit ripe situations . Admittedly, the 
characterization is simple ,  as are the underlying theories . However ,  
the luxury afforded by theoretical simplicity i n  this case i s  a se t of 
unambiguous and testable hypotheses whose rejection or verification 
can guide future theoretical developments . That such guidance is 
currently lacking is illustrated by the agnosticism with which the 
aforementioned theorists view their strategic assumptions . Shepsl e ,  
understandably , i s  more concerned with demonstrating the properties of 
structure-induced equilibria than with developing a predictive theory 
of legislative outcomes . 5 Denzau and Mackay implicitly assume that
sophistication is a better assumption than myopia , but they neither 
argue nor refer to actual legislative occurrences to defend the 
assumption , And elsewhere I have suggested that diversity of 
congressional committees makes both sets of assumptions plausible ,  
depending o n  dominant goals of committee members , as studied by Fenno 
( 1 973 ) ,  But with the exception of scattered anecdotes and some 
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secondary analyses ,  empirical answers to the question of myopia versus 
sophistication of committees in legislatures do not exist . Nor , 
similarly , is there substantial evidence that institutional features 
such as rules have predictable effects in two-stage decision-making , 
Consequently , the theory of legislatures remains detached from actual 
behavior . 
While the gap between theory and data is unfortunate from the 
standpoint of predicting political outcomes , it is nevertheless 
understandable in l ight of several cold hard facts of field research 
that correspond precisely to the ingredients of the fundamental 
equation of politics : preferences and policies are often ambiguou s ,  
susceptible t o  change , and difficult to observe and measure ; 
institutional features are remarkably complex; and strategies are 
potentially as diverse as the individuals that employ them . In light 
of these obstacles , experimentation is a reasonable alternative means 
for assessing the possibility and predictability of sophisticated 
strategies in committees . 
II . EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
The design phase of the experiment consisted of the creation of 
situations that closely reflect the theoretical ingredients of 
preferences and insti tutions , but that l eave strategies undetermined . 
Thus , induced preferences were single-peaked , symmetric and separable ;  
jurisdictions were unidimensional and nonoverlapping; rules were 
ei ther open or closed ; members were divided into committees that were 
assigned unique j urisdictions ; and decisions were made by majority 
voting . Essential features of the experiment are outlined in this 
section . Addi tional details are presented in appendices . 
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Issues and policies were represented as l ines and as points on a 
line , respectively . Each of two committees i n  small experiments and 
three committees in a l arge experiment had exclusive j urisdiction over 
one dimension of the policy space , which therefore was two- or three­
dimensional , depending on the experiment . Thus each committee was 
uniquely empowered to make an initial motion to change the status quo 
on its issue . If a committee was unwilling or unable to report a bill 
to the floor , the status quo was designated the outcome . 
Preferences were induced by compensation charts which , for each 
issue , showed the subjec t ' s  ideal point , his/her compensation for each 
possible outcome,  other subjects ' ideal points but nei ther their 
compensation curves nor their identity , the status quo point , and the 
rule under which the committee 's  bill would be considered on the 
floor . A sample compensation chart was included in the instructions . 
(See Appendix A . )  Each subject had one compensation chart per 
session . A session consisted of two stages of decision-making on each 
issue : a "small group " (committee ) stage in which a bill may have 
been selected and reported , and a "large group " (floor ) stage in which 
all subjects acted on the committees ' bill s .  Members were prohibited 
from looking at other subjects ' compensation charts and at their own 
compensation charts for future sessions . The units in terms of which 
proposals were expressed differed across committees , (e , g , , 0-100 for 
committee A ,  500-1500 for committee B) , but issues were always 
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represented by a 100-unit line on graph paper . 
Committees operated under different rules at different times but 
each committee was assigned the same rule for its first two sessions . 
In several cases one and only one characteristic of the situation was 
permitted to vary from session to session or from commi ttee to 
committee , These features of the design provided several controls and 
ultimately made it possible to answer questions, such as : Do changes 
in rules and/or the status quo affect strategies and outcomes , ceterus 
paribus? If myopic or some other strategies are prevalent among 
inexperienced committees , do such committees learn sophi sticated 
strategies? Moreover , is sophistication transferable across 
institutional setting s ,  e .g . , from open to closed rule si tuations? 
A trial session of the second (floor ) stage was conducted before 
each experiment to acquaint subjects with the open and closed rules , 
Subj ects were encouraged to ask questions during the trial session but 
were not compensated for the trial session outcomes . Actual sessions 
commenced when committees were sent to different rooms for the first 
stage of decision-making . An experimenter accompanied the subjects 
but did not interfere with their deliberations except to answer 
questions . After each committee completed its decision on whether or 
what bill to report to the floor , subjects were brought together for 
the second stage which was supervised by an experimenter who recorded 
on a blackboard the votes , the status of the bil l ,  amendments , etc . , 
and who recognized subjects who wished to make or to discuss 
proposals . Subjects , therefore , could always see the issue currently 
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under consideration, the numerical values o f  the current bill and 
amendment (if any), and the votes of other subjects. 
Three experiments were conducted. The two smaller and identical 
experiments consisted of three sessions in which five subjects were 
assigned to two committees of sizes three and two. The third 
experiment was larger and longer, consisting of four sessions in which 
fifteen subjects were assigned to three committees, each of size five. 
Together the three experiments yielded 24 observations ( 12 under each 
rule). Each observation consists of a committee decision (bill or 
obstruction) at stage one and an outcome (bill, amended bill, or 
status quo) at stage two. Subjects from the first and third 
experiments were undergraduates at the California Institute of 
Technology. Subjects in the second experiment were students at 
Pasadena Community College. 
Although the main objective of the experiment was to assess the 
possibility and predictability of sophisticated versus myopic 
strategies, a larger set of observable possibilities was acknowledged 
g priori. Experimental outcomes could have been consistent with any 
of the following: the hypothesis of myopic behavior, the hypothesis 
of sophisticated behavior, either of the above hypotheses depending on 
the settings, any of several alternative hypotheses (specified below), 
or no known hypotheses. 
These possibilities compose a continuum of possible results. In 
general, the higher on the list, the better the state of the 
legislative theory would seem to be. For example, if no hypotheses 
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are supported or i f  only a hypothesis lacking explicit theoretical 
derivation is supported, the necessary conclusion would be that the 
prevalent legislative theories -- both myopic and sophisticated are 
misguided. In contrast, consistent support for the hypotheses of 
myopic or sophisticated behavior would suggest that, as new and simple 
as it may be, theoretical research of legislatures appears to be on 
the right track. 6 
Given the specific focus on committee strategy, the primary 
concern is with the prediction of bills. The main hypotheses are 
those of myopia and sophistication. 7 
1 .  The myopic prediction is always the committee median. It is a 
straightforward application of Black's theorem within 
committee, irrespective of the committee's place in the larger, 
more complex institutional setting. 
2 .  The sophisticated prediction depends upon rules and ripeness. 
Specifically, under the open rule and ripeness for obstruction, 
the prediction is that the committee will report no bill. 
Under the closed rule and ripeness for sophisticated placement, 
the prediction is a bill whose value equals: 
FM - IFM - sl + e 
FM + IFM - sl - e 
if CM < FM, 
if CM > FM, 
(see figure lb) and 
where e repre�ents a distance barely detectable to the floor 
median voter. 
Since neither the myopic nor sophisticated theory is likely to 
predict perfectly, four competing hypotheses are also considered: the 
floor median, the floor mean, the committee mean, and the focal point. 
3 .  The floor median hypothesis is an application of Black's 
theorem in a special situation for which it probably was not 
intended but nevertheless can be defended. Specifically, the 
committee may select the floor median as its bill because its 
members either will not consider or will not be swayed by the 
advantages of obstruction, or they may anticipate convergence 
to the floor median and therefore try to minimize amendments on 
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the floor by reporting a bill near the anticipated outcome in 
the first place. Note that while the prediction differs from 
that of committee sophistication, the rationale underlying the 
median prediction embraces one essential element of 
sophisticated behavior, namely, foresight. 
4 .  The floor !!!.!!.!!n hypothesis is that the bill will be the 
arithmetic mean of ideal points of all subjects. The basis for 
this prediction is perhaps more normative than descriptive. 
Because �nder some conditions the mean maximizes social 
utility, decision-makers may consider it "good" or "fair" in 
some sense. Committees that report floor mean bills are 
regarded as somewhat sophisticated, since they would appear to 
anticipate future decisions. Nevertheless, their 
sophistication would appear to be driven by a different 
mechanism than individual or small group maximization. 
5. The committee mean hypothesis reflects the same concern for 
"good " or "fair" decisions, but in the smaller, initial 
decision-making arena. Since floor members' preferences would 
seem not to be considered by committees operating under this 
principle, committee mean bills are inconsistent with the 
sophistication hypothesis, but somewhat consistent with myopia. 
6. The focal point hypothesis is that bills and outcomes will be 
clustered on or about the center of the policy space, With the 
possible exception of Schelling's ( 1963) "obvious point, " this 
idea is foreign to the study of politics, but apparently is 
subscribed to by experimental psychologists in some settings. 
It is regarded as more consistent with myopia than with 
sophistication. 
While few readers are likely to take all such hypotheses 
seriously, each hypothesis is likely to have some appeal to some 
readers. Assessment of their predictive abilities, therefore, seems 
worthwhile, even though the experiments were designed principally to 
assess the sophisticated and myopic hypotheses. 
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOPHISTICATION 
Responsiveness of committees to rules and to the location of the 
status quo point are necessary conditions for the exercise of 
sophistication. The theoretical propositions that rules matter and 
13 
that the status quo matters are well known, but empirical support for 
them is rare, with Romer and Rosenthal (1978) being an important 
exception. By design, the experiment permits an opportunity to 
further corroborate the propositions and, in turn, to establish that 
sophistication is indeed possible. 
In six pairs of situations, the configuration of ideal points and 
the rule were fixed and only the status quo changed between 
sessions. 1° For each of the six pairs, the change in the location of 
the status quo point had an effect on committee action. Figures 2a 
and 2b are typical examples. In 2a the committee reported a bill of 
650 to the floor, after which it was amended to 720, the floor median. 
In 2b, under identical ideal points and rules but a different status 
quo point, the committee refused to report a bill, thus the outcome 
was the status quo point. 
[figure 2] 
The differences between these results and Romer and Rosenthal's 
are subtle but important. In Romer and Rosenthal's referendum 
setting, an individual agenda setter makes a single proposal to the 
electorate, knowing that the electorate cannot modify it. The 
legislative analogue is that of a one-member committee (agenda setter) 
reporting a bill (referendum proposal) to the floor (electorate) for 
consideration under a closed rule (referendum). In contrast, in the 
experimental settings in figures 2a and 2b the open rule is in effect 
and the first-stage decision is a collective choice by a committee 
whose members know that their proposal (if any) can be amended in the 
100 
Figure 2 
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next stage of decision-making. The key similarities, however, are 
that the status quo determines the strategic opportunities of the 
proposer (s) and that the proposer (s) are responsive to its location. 
Similarly, there were three pairs of situations in which only the 
rule changed. The effect -- different bills and outcomes under 
different rules -- also supports the possibility of sophisticated 
behavior. For example, figures 2a and 2c are identical with the 
exception of the rule, yet the committee's bill and the outcome are 
notably different. 
IV. THE PREDICTABILITY OF COMMITTEE STRATEGY 
With the possibility of sophistication established, the natural 
follow-up questions concern prediction. Are sophisticated strategies 
more common than myopic ones? Are they somehow natural or must 
decision-makers learn them from experience or from observation? Are 
sophisticated and myopic predictions more or leas accurate than other 
predictions? A divided focus on open and closed rule decisions 
provides the answers. 
Predictive accuracy is a dichotomous matter in one and only one 
case: the sophisticated prediction under the open rule in ripe 
situations is that the committee will obstruct. Thus if obstruction 
occurs the prediction is correct; if a bill is reported the prediction 
is incorrect. Figure 3 summarizes the 12 open rule sessions in the 
three experiments, 10 of which were ripe for obstruction. (The data 
are normalized as described in Appendix B. ) 
[figure 3] 
The most straightforward evidence of sophisticated strategy is 
that in 80 percent of ripe situations (8 of 10), committees indeed 
refused to send a bill to the floor. Since no other hypothesis 
predicts obstruction, the sophistication hypothesis is obviously 
superior in terms of percentages. But obstruction, while common, is 
not universal. What, then, can be learned from instances in which 
committees do report bills to the floor, contrary to the theory of 
sophisticated committees? Since there were only two such instances, 
an analysis of deviant cases is tractable as well as illuminating. 
The first unpredicted decision to report a bill was made by the 
three person committee in the experiment II (observation 4 in figure 
3 ) ,  The non-normalized version of this situation is displayed with 
members' ideal points in figure 4a. It was the committee's first 
meeting, and subject 3 immediately said "Well, it seems the thing to 
do here is find a happy medium -- something the big group will be 
happy with, " after which he began to calculate the mean of ideal 
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points. Scarcely had he begun his calculations, however, when subject 
1 interrupted: ' Wait a minute. We hold a majority here; if we stick 
together we can pass anything. " Notwithstanding the subject's quick 
identification of a design problem in the small experiment (namely, 
rarely if ever do legislatures have standing committees whose 
membership is a majority of the parent body11), the ensuing discussion 
among committee members revealed evidence closely related to the 
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question o f  sophistication versus myopia. But, unlike the committee's 
decision, its discussion was more consistent with the sophistication 
hypothesis than with its myopic counterpart. Subject 1 ultimately 
consented to report a bill of 900 (just one unit from the status quo 
point on the 1000 unit scale), but only after making two rather 
sophisticated points to his fellow committee members. First, he made 
it clear that he could "default" (defect) in the large group, in which 
case he predicted an outcome considerably below the status quo. 
Second, he nevertheless vowed not to defect because, in his words, "If 
I'm in a good position now, you probably will be later. " In short, 1 
tried to convince 2 and 3 that in the long run, a strategy of 
committee unity was probably best. In two of its three sessions, the 
committee pursued the unified strategy, which, of course, would not 
have worked had the committee not been a majority. 
[figure 4] 
The second and only other instance of reporting of a bill in a 
situation ripe for obstruction occurred in the large experiment in a 
situation purposely designed to be a most difficult test. Figure 4b 
represents the third session for committee C in the large experiment 
(observation 11 in figure 3 ) . In the previous sessions this 
committee's bills were considered under the closed rule, so it had no 
prior first-hand experience with the open rule. The ideal points for 
the committee members are scattered throughout the space, making it 
most difficult for subjects to conspire, identify, and execute the 
sophisticated strategy. And, finally, the key subject -- the 
4 
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committee median -- is almost indifferent between the status quo and 
the floor median, barely preferring the former. (In terms of his 
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monetary payoff, the difference was worth only 20 cents.) Under these 
circumstances, the committee's refusal to obstruct is understandable, 
although this is not to deny that the sophisticated prediction failed, 
But the overall case for sophistication is strengthened 
implicitly with additional analysis of all open rule situations in 
which the committee reported a bill, Combining the two nonripe 
situations with the deviant cases in figure 4 provides four such 
observations ( 4 ,  7, 1 1  and 12 in figure 3 ) ,  The question is whether 
in cases of reporting of a bill, committees were inattentive to floor 
preferences and anticipated floor behavior -- in accordance with the 
hypothesis of myopic committees -- or whether the alternative 
hypotheses ( 3-6) are superior, A simple test is that of differences 
in mean errors, where "error" is defined as the distance between the 
predicted and actual bills, The hypotheses for the statistical test 
are: 
H0: Ei - Ej < O 
HA: Ei - Ej L O.
Ei is the average error for the myopic prediction (i = 1); Ej is the 
average error for other non-sophisticated predictions (j = 3 , , , , , 6) . 
Rejection of the null hypothesis, therefore, demonstrates the 
inferiority of the myopic prediction.12
Presented in table 1, the results clearly call for rejection of 
the null hypothesis. In spite of the small number of observations, 
each difference in average errors is significant at less than ,OS. 
With the exception of the committee mean prediction, each difference 
is significant at less than .01. Furthermore, visual inspection of 
individual observations revealed that without exception, committee 
bills were closer to floor means and medians than to the committee 
median. Combined with actual deliberations of committee members and 
the prevalence of obstruction in ripe situations, this evidence 
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continues to favor the contention that attentiveness to preferences on 
the floor and expectations about floor activity played a major part in 
prior committee decision-making, even for those relatively few 
committees for-which obstruction did not come naturally. 
[table 1] 
The analysis of closed rule experiments is similar to that for 
the open rule. The main difference is that in closed rule settings 
the sophisticated prediction is directly comparable to other 
predictions because each identifies a point or small region of the 
policy space on or in which the committee's bill should lie. 
Consequently, the earlier percent-correct analysis is unnecessary, and 
hypothesis tests and visual inspection of committee decisions are 
sufficient to answer the question of whether committees behave 
predictably and with foresight in closed rule settings. The 
hypothesis tests now focus on the prediction of sophistication, 
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Table 1 
Errors in Predictions of Bills when Sophistication Prediction Fails
* 
(Open rule: N = 4) 
-
Prediction E t p 
1. Myopic 28.5 
3. Floor Median 6.5 22.0 4.6 .010 
4. Floor Mean 3.5 25.0 13. 7 <.001 
5. Committee Mean 21.1 7.4 2.6 .040 
6. Focal Point 9.8 18.7 9.8 .001 
* t statistics are one-tailed. 
� is !he probability of improperly rejecting the null hypothesis: 
El - Ej < 0, j = 3,4,5,6. 
1 9  
Ei is the average error of the sophisticated prediction ( i  = 2 ) , and 
Ej are the average errors for other predictions (j = 1 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6) . 
Rejection of this null hypothesis demonstrates superiority of the 
sophisticated prediction. 
Table 2 shows the consistent and confident rejection of the null 
hypothesis with respect to each competitor, and figure 5 unambiguously 
illustrates how committees are capable of and willing to 
sophisticatedly place bills to capture the floor median voter. With 
the sole exception of observation 1 8  (again, the unified majority 
committee), bills were on or very near the sophisticated prediction. 
Moreover, little if any learning was required by the committees: even 
those confronting a ripe situation in their very first session 
conformed to the hypothesis of sophisticated behavior. Sophisticated 
placement in closed rule settings, therefore, appears to be even more 
natural than sophisticated obstruction in open rule settings. 
[table 2 and figure 5] 
V. PREDICTABILITY OF OUTCOMES 
While the main purpose of the experiment was to test predictions 
about committee decisions, the preceding results strongly suggest that 
first- and second-stage decisions are inextricably linked. An 
examination of decision-making on the floor further clarifies this 
relationship. 
The sample from which we make inferences about floor behavior 
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under the open rule is necessarily small because bills were reported 
to the floor in only 4 of the 12 open rule situations, But 
conditional on a committee reporting a bill, sophisticated and myopic 
predictions of outcomes are identical: 13 amendments should converge 
to FM, which Shepsle has shown to be a structure-induced equilibrium. 
Of the four relevant observations ( 4 ,  7, 11, and 12 in figure 3), 
three are consistent with this prediction, otherwise known as Black's 
median voter theorem. In observations 7 and 12, the outcome was 
precisely equal to the floor median voter's ideal point. And in 
observation 11 the outcome was 560, with FM at 561. Once again, the 
outlier is observation 4 -- the unified majority committee. 
Closed Rule, 
Predicted outcomes in ripe situations under the closed rule are 
also contingent upon the location of the reported bill, If the bill 
is sophisticatedly placed, it should pass; otherwise it should fail 
and the status quo is the outcome. 
In the 11 ripe situations (13-23 in figure 5), 10 bills were 
placed near the sophisticated prediction (all except observation 18), 
In those 10 sessions, the sophisticated bill passed 8 times, The two 
exceptions are informative. The failure of the sophisticated bill in 
observation 17 is also attributable to the unified majority committee. 
This time, however, the unfailing loyalty of subject 1 transcended his 
committee's jurisdiction when he voted contrary to his induced 
preferences and thus sealed the defeat of the other committee's bill. 
(Both of his committee colleagues preferred the status quo to the 
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bill, and voted as such.) 
The second exception .(observation 20) occurred because subject 2 
made a mistake, After the vote was recorded and the outcome was 
announced, he pleaded that he be allowed to change his vote, and 
proponents of the bill vociferously joined. in his cause. But 
ultimately he was informed that such favors are reserved for members 
of Congress, In subsequent sessions, the mistake had precisely the 
effect predicted by Denzau and Mackay: "Incomplete information and 
risk aversion , , , [will] lead committee members to behave in a more 
cautious fashion under the closed rule" ( 1983, p, 759), In two of the 
three remaining closed rule sessions, committees moderated their 
proposals more than they thought was necessary, fearing, as one 
subject put it, that "some dumb turkey on the floor won't know what's 
good for him." In other words, risk-aversion manifested itself in 
attempts to build coalitions that were slightly
.
larger than minimal­
winning (cf, Riker, 1962, and Koehler, 1972). 
Effects of the mistake were also evident in rhetorical strategies 
on the floor, where committee members' concerns were sometimes blatant 
enactments of power as persuasion, a la Neustadt ( 1980). Neustadt 
described the essence of presidential power as the ability of the 
executive to induce others "to believe that what he wants of them is 
what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them 
to do in their interest, not his" ( 1980, p, 38), One committee member 
implicitly took Neustadt's advice with this terse speech on the floor: 
"I remind the person at 533 that this bill is definitely in his or her 
best interest, so by all means, he or she should vote for it, " which 
indeed she did, 
VI. DISCUSSION 
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The most convincing and consistent result of the experiments is 
the failure of the hypothesis of myopic behavior. But on a more 
constructive note, a competing theory has been corroborated, In 
short, sophisticated behavior by committees is not only 
characterizable theoretically nor is it a mere empirical possibility. 
In these experimental settings, sophistication was the typical 
strategy, moreover a strategy that renders outcomes predictable. 
If when compared with previous experimental evidence on 
committees and, more specifically, on agenda setting, this finding 
appears redundant, two unique features of these experiments deserve 
further emphasis, First, these were situations in which the agenda 
setter was a committee -- not an individual as in the models of Romer 
and Rosenthal ( 1978) and Mackay and Weaver ( 1983) and in the 
experiments of Isaac and Plott (1978), Kormendi and Plott (1982), 
Stengel and Miller ( 1983) and Eavey and Miller ( 1984a, 1984b), 
Therefore, in these experiments support for the hypothesis of 
sophistication required that several individuals conspire to exploit 
ripe situations. While the possibility of collective exercises of 
sophistication often has been posited somewhat anthropomorphically by 
treating the committee as a unit with a single preference (e.g., 
Weingast, 1981, p. 156; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, p. 514), it 
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remained to be demonstrated that even committees whose members have 
diverse preferences can exercise sophistication. Second, this 
phenomenon is not institution-specific; collective exercises of 
sophistication were prevalent under open and closed rules. 
Furthermore, since sophisticated predictions are different under each 
institutional setting, the alternative possibility that committee 
members simply found the best strategy quickly and adhered to it 
consistently without regard to rules can be rejected. Optimal 
committee strategies are functions of preferences and institutions, 
and the committee members collectively demonstrated a predictable 
responsiveness to both. 
While these conclusions are inescapable with respect to the 
experimental legislature, the hazards of extrapolating from the 
laboratory to the field are fully acknowledged. Such issues are 
discussed at length in Fiorina and Plott (1978) and in Plott ( 1979), 
and skeptical readers are encouraged to study their compendia of 
reservations and rebuttals, For present purposes, however, a 
rehashing of the pros and cons of experimental research generally is 
less informative than a discussion of the usefulness of these 
particular findings on sophistication versus myopia. Specifically, 
four sources of skepticism are anticipated, 
Subiects � legislators, An initial argument is that 
experimental subjects are different from legislators. This contention 
cannot be disputed, but examination of its implications diminishes its 
damage, Because the subjects in the experiments obviously had no 
prior legislative experience (in neither real nor experimental 
legislatures), we would expect that relative to experienced 
legislators the subjects would be less inclined to respond to 
situations strategically. Thus the obvious difference between 
subjects and legislators probably biases the test in favor of the 
myopic hypothesis, which was confidently rejected in spite of 
differences between subjects and legislators. 14
Information Conditions. A second possibility is that favorable 
information conditions made identification and employment of 
sophisticated strategies too easy. The response is three-fold. 
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First, information was not as good for individual subjects as it may 
seem. While committee members knew the distribution of ideal points, 
they knew � of the following: which ideal point belonged to which 
member, the monetary value of outcomes to other members at their ideal 
points, or the induced utility functions of other members (whether 
linear, quadratic, symmetric, etc.). Second, the unavailability of 
such information appeared, if anything, to make subjects somewhat more 
sophisticated than the simple theory predicts. Rather than simply 
assume that everyone's payoff functions were linear and symmetric, 
committee members sometimes modified their bills to allow for the 
possibility of either irregular preferences (such as asymmetry) or 
nonmaximizing behavior (such as the avowed mistake of subject 2 in 
observation 20) . Third and perhaps most important, the effects of 
information conditions on sophisticated behavior by committees can be 
studied in subsequent similar experiments, as McKelvey and Ordeshook 
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( 1984) have done in an electoral setting, for example. 
Multidimensionality. If experimental committee settings were 
unidimensional but congressional committee settings often are not, are 
these findings irrelevant to congressional decision-making? Not 
necessarily. In practice, committees with multidimensional 
jurisdictions divide their attention. The House Education and Labor 
Committee, for example, rarely considers legislation that pertains 
both to education and to labor. Furthermore, even within single but 
nevertheless technically multidimensional jurisdictions, the most 
controversial parts of legislation are often unidimensiona1 15 or are 
perceived by most members as suoh. 16 And finally, generalization of 
the theory of sophisticated committees to multidimensional settings 
would not change its underlying rational. Under open rules, for 
example, the necessary and sufficient condition for sophisticated 
obstruction is that the status quo is preferred by a committee 
majority to the expected outcome under the amendment process. A 
problem, of course, is that unless theoretically stringent and 
empirically rare conditions are met (Plott, 1967), the expected 
outcome is not straightforwardly characterizable theoretically because 
of the cyclic majority preference relation. In actual settings, 
however, committee members almost surely have expectations about the 
relative likelihood of possible outcomes, in which case expected 
utility theory is a promising vehicle for the extension of the form of 
the theory tested here (see Denzau and Mackay, 1983, and Enelow and 
Hinich, 1984). A testable conjecture is that sophistication still 
occurs under conditions of imperfect information, but that more 
learning is required for committee members to exhibit it. 
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Repeated Play Design, A final basis for skepticism towards these 
findings is that the two main theories of legislatures pertain to 
single play situations (one committee decision followed by at most one 
floor decision), but that the experiment provided for repeated play 
(multiple sessions), This created an opportunity for equilibria 
different from those of the static models. For example, conditions 
were potentially conducive for Axelrod's (1981, 1984) emergence of 
cooperation or for Weingast's ( 1979) norm of universalism. 
Specifically, committee assignments were fixed throughout the 
experiment, thus committee members knew they would have future 
interactions with one another. Moreover, the number of sessions was 
not specified, thus defections from contemplated cooperative 
strategies could not unravel from the end to the beginning of the 
experiment. 
The reason committee members were not reassigned between 
sessions (aside from the logistical confusion that was likely to have 
ensued) was that learning was expected to be necessary for 
sophistication, However, because learning was not required, and 
because committees were sophisticated even in the presence of 
opportunities for cooperative behavior, the findings are perhaps all 
the more convincing. With the sole exception of the now familiar 
member in experiment II who indeed anticipated long-term gains from 
short-term "nice" strategies (Axelrod, 1984, p. 3 3 ) , decision-making 
consistently competitive in committee and on the floor. Coalitions 
substantially larger than minimal winning simply did not form. 
To infer that the hypothesis of universalism, too, should be 
rejected would exceed the bounds of the test which focused on 
sophisticated versus myopic strategies -- not on minimal-winning 
versus universal coalitions. Nevertheless, reconsideration of the 
hypothesis does seem appropriate, and future studies should note two 
points. First, the absence of cooperation in these experiments 
contrasts with findings of previous but quite different experiments, 
such as Miller and Oppenheimer ( 1982) and Eavey and Miller ( 1984a). 
Second, in spite of considerable diversity in these and other 
experiments, none seems to have incorporated fully the essential 
conditions for cooperation, namely, long-term repeated play with a 
high probability of continued interaction with present adversaries. 
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In conclusion, even if all such reservations were (or can be) 
successfully refuted, no claim is made to have proved the theory of 
sophisticated committees. No matter how stringent the test and how 
convincing the results, there remains a possibility that other 
heretofore unspecified models will predict just as well. But whereas 
this inability to prove theories is not unique to experimental 
research, and whereas a similarly successful model is not likely to be 
developed in the near future, it seems only reasonable to exploit 
these findings in future research of all sorts: theoretical, 
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experimental, and empirical. Specifically, theorists of legislatures 
may comfortably table the assumption of uniform sincere voting within 
committees and instead can focus either on mixtures of sincere and 
sophisticated strategies (Denzau, Riker and Shepsle, 1 984) , or on 
refined versions of committee sophistication (Denzau and Mackay, 1 983 ; 
Enelow and Hinich, 1 984) . Concomitantly, experimentalists can begin 
to test such revised theories in laboratory settings, while 
empiricists can proceed with a more focused search for instances of 
sophisticated strategies in actual legislatures. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in majority decision-making, The 
instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money. The currency 
used in the experiment is francs. Each franc is worth dollars to 
you. Do not reveal this value to anyone, At the end of the 
experiment all of your earnings over � francs will be converted to 
dollars and paid to you in cash, 
There will be several sessions in the experiment. Each session 
has two stages : a small group � and a large group �. Each of 
you belongs to the large group and to one of three small groups: 
participants 1-S are in small group A, 6-10 are in B, and 11- 1 5  are 
in c .  
Each small group has the exclusive right to make an initial 
decision on a given issue, An issue is represented as a simple number 
line, and a group's decision is represented as a point on the line. 
In the first stage of a session each small group meets in a different 
room. If a majority of members in a small group approves of a point, 
the point becomes a bill and is taken to the large group for the 
second and final stage of decision-making in the session. The large 
group then decides whether to accept, reject, or, in some cases, amend 
the bill. The final decision of the large group is called the 
outcome. 
COMPENSATION 
The amount you earn in each session depends on the outcomes on 
issues A, B, and C. Before each session, you will study a 
compensation chart that tells precisely how much you earn for any 
possible outcome. For example, look at your compensation chart for 
Session 0 ,  The outcome on issue A may be anywhere between 0 and 1000 . 
If, for example, the outcome on issue A is the point, SOO, then you 
will receive compensation of 400 francs. If the outcome is 900 ,  
however, your compensation would b e  only 200 francs. Notice that as 
the outcome gets farther and farther from the point you like most, 
your compensation always declines. 
In any group -- small or large -- different participants 
typically want different outcomes, The point you like most is always 
represented by a star ( •), The dots ( , )  along the bottom of the chart 
represent the points that other individuals like most. Thus if the 
specific compensation levels for some other participant were drawn (as 
yours is) the peak on that individual's ohart would be directly above 
his/her dot, just as your peak is directly above your star. 
The chart also shows a status ll\!.Q. point ( S) for each issue. If a 
small group decides not to take a bill to the large group, or if the 
large group cannot reach a final decision on the bill, the status quo 
point will be the outcome, and you will be compensated accordingly. 
For example, if the status quo is the outcome on Issue A for Session 
O ,  you would earn 450 francs . 
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You should keep all of these things in mind and decide before 
each session which point you want the large group to choose . Then do 
whatever you can within the rules to get things to go your way . How 
or how much you participate does not matter, as long as you obey the 
rules . 
RULES FOR SMALL GROUPS 
The small group must make one -- and may make two -- decisions . 
It must decide whether or not to take a bill to the large group . And 
if it decides to, it must decide on the location of the bill. The 
bill must have a numerical value different from the status quo (S) and 
between the two endpoints of the chart . Small group meetings will be 
unstructured, but the following rules must be obeyed . 
1 .  Each member of the small group must have an opportunity to 
propose a bill and to discuss the merits or demerits of any 
proposed bill. 
2 .  At least three members of the small group must vote to take a 
bill to the large group, but remember that a small group is not 
required to take a bill to the large group . If a small group 
explicitly decides not to take a bill to the large group, or if 
it is unable to reach majority agreement on a bill, no 
decision- making will take place in the large group and 
everyone's compensation will be based on the status quo point 
(S) for that issue . 
3 .  You may not discuss issues other than that of your own small 
group, nor may you look at compensation charts for sessions 
other than the current session . 
4 .  You may not mention anything quantative about your 
compensation, such as how much a point is worth to you, whether 
you have begun to profit, etc . You may, however, discuss 
which points you do and do not like, why you like or dislike 
them, etc . Under no circumstances can you make agreements 
about activities that might involve other participants after 
the experiment . For example, physical threats and deals to 
share earnings are prohibited . 
RULES FOR THE LARGE GROUP 
If the small group takes a bill to the large group, the bill will 
be the first point to be considered, The process of decision-making 
in the large group depends on what rule -- open or closed -- is in 
effect . The compensation chart tells you what rule will be in effect 
for each issue . 
Open rule . Under the open rule, any member may propose an 
amendment to move the bill to a different point, but only one such 
amendment can be active at any given time . Suppose, for example, you 
are participant #5 and the small group 's bill is at the point 1 5 5 ,  but 
you want the large group to consider the point 166 , Then you simply 
state "#5 moves to amend the bill from 1 5 5  to 166 , "  Your amendment 
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becomes active when it is repeated and recorded on the board . Any 
member of the large group may then speak for or against the amendment . 
After discussion, a vote is taken . If the amendment passes by a 
majority vote, the point 166 becomes the new bill, and it may then be 
amended . If the amendment fails, the bill remains at the point 1 5 5 ,  
but i s  still subject t o  further amendments until debate i s  formally 
ended (see below) . To summarize, majority-approved amendments simply 
change the location of the bill . You may discuss and pass as many 
amendments as you wish . 
At any time during consideration of an amendment or bill, a 
!!!Q11Qn to fil'.!l! debate is in order . If there are no objections, either 
an immediate vote is taken on the active amendment (if any), or a 
final vote is taken on the bill (if there is no active amendment) . If 
any participant objects to the motion to end debate, however, the 
motion to end debate will itself be put to a majority vote . If it 
fails, the process continues where it left off .  I f  it passes, a vote 
on either the amendment or bill (as specified above) is taken . 
Closed rule . Under the closed rule, the bill cannot be amended 
by the large group . The only decision of the large group is whether 
to accept or to reject the bill. Discussion is permitted until a 
motion to end debate passes (or receives no objections), after which a 
final vote is taken on the bill. If the bill receives a majority of 
votes (for example, 8 of 1 5 ) , it becomes the outcome.  If it fails to 
receive a majority, the status quo point (S) is the outcome . 
Additional rules for the large rn. 
1 .  Only one person may speak at a time . 
2 .  You may take notes, but you may not pass notes . 
3 .  You may not view other participants' compensation charts, and 
you should keep your own chart out of view of others . 
4 .  Rules 3 and 4 for small groups also pertain to the large group . 
To demonstrate open and closed rules, motions to end debate, 
etc, , we will conduct a trial session of the large group, using the 
information on your compensation chart for Session O .  We will assume
that the small groups made these decisions: small group A decided not 
to bring a bill to the large group; small group B decided that its 
bill (on Issue B) will be 9; and small group C chose 581 for its bill 
(on Issue C), Please mark these on your compensation chart . 
Now, to prepare for the trial session and the actual experiment, 
please take the quiz on the next page . 
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QUIZ 
Refer to Issue A on page 2 to answer questions 1-6.  
1 .  At _ I would make the most possible money from the outcome on 
Issue A. The amount I would earn is francs, 
2 .  At I would make the least possible money from the outcome 
on Issue A. The amount I would earn is approximately _ 
francs, 
3 .  If the small group does not bring a bill to the large group, I 
would earn _ francs because the outcome would be _. If 
the outcome was a larger number, I would earn 
(more/less) money. 
4 .  If 210 is the small group 's  bill is at the point 210 and an 
amendment to move it to 500 fails,  then the bill is at the 
point _. 
5 .  If an amendment to move the bill from (the answer in 4 )  to 440 
passes , then the bill is at the point 
6 .  If a motion to end debate is made and no one objects, a vote is 
taken on the bill. Can any amendments be offered after this 
vote (yes/no) _? If the bill fails, then the outcome is _. 
7 ,  Now look at Issue Q, Notice that the bill is at 581 and that 
the closed rule is in effect. Can the point 544 be offered as 
an amendment _ (yes/no)? 
8 .  If a vote is taken and the bill fails, the outcome will be __ , 
and I will earn approximately _ francs. 
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APPENDIX B 
NORMALIZATION OF DATA 
Normalized data were used for figures and tables reported in the 
text. First, all points (ideal points, FM, CM, S, bills, outcomes and 
predictions) were linearly transformed to a 0-100 scale, (For some 
observations all such values were subtracted from 100 to invert the 
configuration. ) Second, points were converted to normalized distances 
from a specified key point, depending upon the rule. Specifically, 
where FM, CM and S were the 0-100 normalized values of the floor and 
committee medians and the status quo, their respective normalized 
values, FM•, CM
•
, and s* were defined according to the rule. Open 
• • 
rule situations were always transformed with CM and FM fixed at 3 5  
and 70 respectively, Closed rule situations were normalized with FM
• 
and s
* 
fixed at 70 and 85 . With these reference points, the 
normalized values of all other points were computed as distances from 
CM
• 
(in open rule situations) or from FM
• 
(in closed rule situations). 
Algebraically, for a point x, its normalized value, x
•
, was computed 
as: 
• 
x 
• 
x 
• • 
CM• + ,...CMu.__-�F-'-'M'-FM - CM 
• 
= FM 
• • 
+ .. s __ -�F�M� 
S - FM 
(x - CM), under the open rule, or 
(x - FM) under the closed rule. 
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Table C3 
Non-normalized Predict ions and Results 
Obs . Exp . St s .  l s s .  Hrop i c  
l 
1 3  
2 
1 4  
1 5  
3 
4 
1 6  
5 
1 7  
1 8  
6 
7 
8 
1 9  
9 
1 0  
20 
21 
22 
1 1  
23 
24 
1 2  
2 
3 
I I  
2 
3 
I J I  
2 
3 
4 
* no bill
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
c 
A 
B 
c 
A 
B 
c 
A 
8 
c 
** no prediction
1 200 
52 
1 200 
52 
1 200 
52 
1 200 
52 
1 200 
52 
1 200 
52 
1 50 
85 
5 1 5  
1 50 
85 
558 
4 1 0  
BO 
540 
1 50 
40 
585 
Pr t d i c t i on s  ( b i l l s >  
Sop h . F .Hdn . F .Mt o11n C .Mt o11n 
• 
64 
• 
64 
8 1 0
• 
ti 
64 
ti 
64 
B I O  
ti 
1111 
• 
531 
• 
• 
572 
250 
64
• 
560 
40 
1111 
71 1 882 . 2  
71 69 . 2  
71 1 
71 
71 l 
7 1  
71 1 
71 
7 1 1 
7 1  
71 1 
7 1  
720 
28 
535 
720 
28 
576 
2 1 0  
60 
561 
720 
61 
530 
882 . 2  
69 . 2  
882 . 2  
6 9 . 2  
882 . 2  
69 . 2  
882 . 2  
69 . 2  
882 . 2  
69 . 2  
549 , 7  
45 . 1
528 . 6  
'548 . 7  
45. l
571 . 5  
263 . 3  
63 . 9  
1555 . 9  
546 
55 . 9
539 . B  
1 057 
51 . 5  
1 057 
51 . 5  
1 057 
51 . 5  
1 057 
51 . 5  
1 057 
51 . 5  
1 057 
5 1 . 5  
1 32 . 0  
86 . 8  
5 1 5 . 6  
1 32 
64 
565 . 2  
404 
70 
545 . 8  
1 32 
45 . 8
568 
Foc o11 l 
1 000 
50 
1 000 
50 
1 000 
50 
1 000 
50 
1 000 
50 
1 000 
50 
500 
50 
550 
500 
50 
550 
500 
50 
550 
500 
50 
550 
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Rnu l t s  
Ou t c omt B i l l  
889 
64 
889 
66 
790 
62 
900 
68 
889 
79 
850 
62 
720 
44 
531 
560 
44 
581 
250 
63 
560 
600 
43 
530 
• 
64 
• 
66 
790
• 
900 
68 
• 
67 
850 
ti 
650 
• 
531 
• 
• 
574 
250 
63 
558 
600 
43 
535 
Table C4 
Errors in Predictions o f  Bills* 
Predict ion 
Open Ru l e  (N = 4 )  
1 .  Hyop i c
3 ,  F l oor Hedi an
4 • FI oor Hean
5. Comm . Hun
6. Foc a l
C l osed Ru l e  < N  = 1 2> 
1 .  Hyop i c
2 .  Soph i s t i c a t e d
3,  F l oor Ht d i an 
4 .  F l oor Hun
5. Comm . Hun
6 .  Foc a l
( I >  
28. 498
6 . 503 
3 . 5 1 5  
21 . 093 
9 . 8 1 3  
40 . 474 
3 . 4 1 6  
1 0 . 447 
5 . 929 
32 . 396 
38 . 435 
Errors 
( 2 )  
828 . 991 
59 . 1 66 
1 5 . 485 
498 . 0 74 
1 0 1 . 245 
1 761 . 747 
1 7 . 865 
1 2 1 . 8 1 9  
4 4 . 029
1 1 20 . 438 
1 876 . 3 1 6  
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( 3) ( 4 )  
37. 000 1 556 . 000 
8 . 475 1 1 0 . 052 
4 . 702 33 . 30 9  
28 . 1 75 1 0 4 1 . 893 
1 2 .000 1 53 . 500 
22 . 091  6 1 9 . 000 
2 . 000 6 . 364 
5 . 982 4 9 . 420 
3 . 343 1 6 . 608 
1 8 . 1 64 437 . 398 
1 7 . 455 323 . 81 8  
* Entries in column (1) were used in the t-test s , and are mean absolute
deviations between the predicted and actual bills , fully normalized
as described in Appendix B. Entries in column (2)  are squared
deviations between predicted and reported bill s .  Column ( 3 )  and
(4) , respectively , are mean errors and squared errors of data
normalized only to a 0-100 scale . 
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APPENDIX D 
COMPENSATION OF SUBJECTS 
In the experiments I and II , subjects were compensated according 
to the formula :  
where 
Dk is the total dollar compensation for the kth subj ect , 
rk is the his/her franc-to-dollar conversion rate , 
Bk is the floor amount of francs above which the kth subject 
profited 
( 1 )  
The quantity inside parentheses is the sum of earnings i n  francs over 
all sessions and issues ( 1  = A  and 2 = B) . Francs earned were always 
linear functions of distance , specifically : 
where 
Fijk is the number of francs received by k in session i ,  for
issue j ,
Mijk is the maximum amount k can receive (at his /her ideal
point ) ,
( 2 )  
Nijk is the 0-100 normalized distance between the actual outcome
and k ' s ideal point in session 1 ,  issue j ,  and
Pijk is the slope of k ' s ( linear) preference curve . 
In turn, Mijk and pijk were functions of aijk ' a weight assigned to
the subj ect for the session and issue . Specifically , 
40 
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
Thus Dk i n  ( 1 )  ul timately depends upon the 3 x 2 x S weight matrix, a ,  
the conversion rate vector , y ,  the participation fee, & ,  and , of 
course , the ideal points and outcomes . The values of a ,  y ,  and & are
given in table D l ,  and comparable data for experiment III ( for i = 1 
to 4 sessions , j = 1 to 3 issues and k = 1 to 1 5  subj ects ) is 
presented in table D2 . Although the parameter values appear to vary 
greatly , the final earnings , by design, were quite uniform . 
Table Dl 
Weights (a) , Conversion Rates (y) and Participation Fees (o) 
for Experiments I and II 
( k )  
2 3 4 5 
( i )  ( j )  
I I . 3 8 3 2 . 2  
2 . 2  4 4 4 , 4  
a = 2 I . 4  1 0  4 2 . 2  
2 . 2  4 2 5 . 5  
3 I . 3  1 0  5 I • I 
2 . I 2 2 5 . 5  
y • l . 5  . 025 . 05 . 05 . 5  ] 
0 .. [ 20 400 1 50 250 25 ] 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  A partial list includes Black ( 1 948 ,  1 95 8 ) , Plott ( 1 967) , 
Farquharson ( 1 969) , McKelvey ( 1976) , Shepsle ( 197 9 ) , Denzau and 
Mackay ( 1 983 ) , Krehbiel ( 1 983 ) , and Enelow and Hinich ( 1 984) , 
2 .  See, for example , Fenno ( 1 966 , 1 973 ) , Manley ( 1970) , Price 
( 1 97 2 ) , Ferejohn ( 1974) , Schick ( 1 9 80 ) , Unekis and Riesel bach 
( 1 984) , and Smith and Deering ( 1 984) . 
3 .  While addi tional formality is not needed in this paper , the 
similarities between this relatively stylized equation and an 
al ternative formulation combining elements of social choice and 
game theory is worth noting . Letting X represent outcomes, R a 
profile of individuals '  preferences ,  G a given institutional 
arrangement,  and S a se t of individuals '  strategies , and then 
defining & and £ as sets of all possible preference profiles and 
strategies ( respectively) , the social choice function F : & -7X is 
implemented by a game form G : £ -7X in such a way tha t  for all 
profiles Re&, F (R) = G 0 � (fi) , where � : & -7£ is the equilibrium 
correspondence of G .  
4 .  Formally , a situation is ripe for sophisticated obstruction in 
unidimensional jurisdictions if S >- cm FM . That is , the status 
quo must be preferred by the committee median voter to the floor 
median, A situation is ripe for sophisticated placement if 
CM < S < FM or CM > S > FM, and 
( FM-S ( i ( FM-CM ( . 
i.e. , S must be between CM and FM, and FM must be at least as 
close to S as to CM. 
S. However, his subsequent research with various colleagues has 
moved away from the assumption of sincerity, See, for example, 
Shepsle and Weingast ( 1984a) and Denzau, Riker and Shepsle 
(1984). 
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6 .  The ordering of the first and second hypotheses is debatable, 
Myopia is listed first because it preceded and was developed with 
more rigor than the theories that employ the assumption of 
sophistication, 
7 .  Hereafter, deliberate stylistic misdemeanors in the use of 
adjectives are committed in order to avoid bulky sentences, For 
example, the terms "myopic prediction" and "sophisticated 
hypothesis, "  technically (but verbosely) mean "the prediction 
based on the assumption of myopic committees " and "the hypothesis 
that committees will behave sophisticatedly, as specified by the 
theory, " respectively, 
8 .  Operationally, e equals one unit o n  the graph paper o n  which 
subjects' compensation charts were drawn. Thus, for example, on 
a 0-1000 scale e = 10; on a 0-100 scale, e = 1. 
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9, Summation of individual utilities is sometimes called a 
Benthamite social welfare function. If preferences are quadratic 
-- such as: Ui (O) = max - (xi - 6)
2, where Ui (O) is member i 's 
utility for proposal a ,  and max is his utility at his ideal 
point, xi then the Benthamite social welfare function is 
maximized at the mean of ideal points, See Shepsle and Weingast 
( 1984b, footnote 9) or Krehbiel ( 1984, footnote 7) for proofs, 
10. Situations are regarded as identical up to linear 
transformations. For example, in experiment III, session 1, the 
situation for committee A was the same as session 2 for committee 
B, except that ideal points were inverted and transformed from a 
0-1000 scale to a 0-100 scale, and the status quo was moved from
outside to within the region between CM and FM. Appendix B 
presents these and other data that determine the strategic 
situations. 
1 1. An obvious exception, of course, is the House's Committee of the 
Whole which, for theoretical purposes, is regarded as the parent 
body, not a committee. 
12, Alternatively, hypothesis tests could be conducted with mean 
squared errors, or with nonnormalized data from which either 
absolute or squared errors are computed. In all cases, the 
results are consistent with those discussed in the text . 
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13 , McKelvey and Niemi ( 1 97 8) prove that if a Condorc e t  winner ( an 
alternative that beats all others ) exists , sophisticated voting 
ensures its selection. From Black ( 1 958) we know that FM is such 
a point . 
1 4 .  Some of the subjects had participated in other experiments , but 
not in committee experiments ,  Moreover, experiments I and II 
were identical and had virtually identical results in spite of 
different subj ect pools,  one of which was expected to be less 
inclined to exercise sophisticated strategies , 
1 5 .  See , for example,  Asbell ( 1 97 8) , whose detailed discussion of the 
extension of the Clean Air Act -- an enormous and complex piece 
of legislation -- suggests that the overriding consideration in 
committee was the setting of permissible levels of NOx in the 
surprisingly well-defined range of . 4  to 2 , 0  grams per mile , 
16 , For exampl e ,  the Maritime Authorization Bill (HR 5723 ) of the 
98th Congress contained at least three specific provisions : 
construction subsidies , loan guarantees and development funds , 
Yet members seemed to evaluate the legislation more 
parsimoniously in terms of how much it helped American 
shipbuilders,  in effect collapsing three (or mor e )  dimensions 
into one , See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,  October 2 ,  
1 982 , p .  2443 . 
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